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the theological framework that informs these five versions is clearly 
evident, i t  can also be said that each of the five may legitimately claim 
to have a basis in Jesus himself. The reason that there are five versions 
is that the NT authors see Jesus' activity as Divine Man as represent- 
ing his mission to be related in varying degrees to his essence as the 
Christ. 
James M. Robinson reviews the history of the exegesis of the para- 
bles of the kingdom since Juelicher from a methodological point of 
view. He shows how the New Hermeneutic approaches the parables 
allowing the parabolic form to function meaningfully, rather than 
folIowing the previous exegetical methodologies that considered form 
as irrelevant to content. A parable is not a coded presentation of an 
abstract truth, nor an abstract .understanding of existence. The New 
Hermeneutic gives a material role to language since it itself actualizes 
God's reign. On this basis the parables are conceived as "a language 
event potentialTy admitting the hearer of God's grace." The locus of 
God's reign is the language of Jesus, which presents the possibilities 
from which reality is actualized. In the parables reality comes into 
language. In this way form and content are interwoven. 
The two essays in this collection which merit special attention are 
the first and the last, the former for the originality of its conception, 
and the latter for Robinson a t  his expository best, even if this reviewer 
could not decide what it means to say that a parable names its true 
being. 
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Young, Norman J. History and Existential Theology: The Role of 
History in the Thought of RudoEf Bultmann. Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1969. 174 pp. $ 5.95. 
While admitting that the post-Bultmannian era has already begun, 
Norman Young, Professor of Systematic Theology, Queens College, 
University of Melbourne, seeks valiantly through this book to bring 
Bultmann back into the mainstream of theological thought. Most 
readers will conclude that his efforts have been in vain, since new 
issues have arisen and the locus of attention has shifted to focus 
on man in all his social dimensions. The book is somewhat quixotic 
and belated in making its appearance. I t  is about ten years too late. 
The dates of the material cited in the footnotes attest to this. 
Nevertheless, for a student of the new generation who needs to make 
acquaintance with the history of theology, this book will serve as 
an excellent introduction to Bultmann's theology. The author writes 
with clarity and exposes the significant strands of BuItmann's thought. 
He treats his subject in three parts: I, Bultmann's View of History; 
11, History and Theological Method; 111, History and Doctrine. 
*go SEMINARY STUDIES 
Under I, he deals with Bultmann's distinction between nature and 
history and historisch and geschichtlich. Then he deals with Bultmann's 
concept of Geschichtlichkeit and eschatological existence. Under 11, 
he discusses Bultmann's method in dealing with hermeneutics and 
demythologization, relating these to the understanding of history 
explained in I. In 111, he explains Bultmann's concept of revelation, 
of the eschatological event of Christ, and of man's existence. 
Throughout the discussion Young, while critical, seeks to work 
within Bultmann's system. He seems to think that his work is a 
a corrective rather than a repudiation of Bultmann. Therefore, he 
defends Bultmann against what he considers unjust criticism, but, 
on the other hand, criticizes him for not allowing his method to go 
far enough. He agrees with Bultmann's hermeneutical method i n  
principle but not with what i n  fact occurs in the application of this 
method. He illustrates this with Bultmann's use of John and Paul as 
norm and the neglect of other parts of the NT, or with his acceptance 
of certain ideas of John and Paul to the rejection of other ideas in 
these same writers. He admits that there is no distorted exegesis 
but the result is only partial exegesis. He would, therefore, seek a 
more adequate approach which would encympass the entire NT. 
He finds this approach basically in Bultmann's principles. "If the 
most basic of his hermeneutical principles is applied, viz., that the 
interpreter should brim to the text the question that concerned the 
author, this would mean admitting that the question of human existen- 
ce appropriate in most cases is not appropriate in others, and that 
the history which interests some of the writers is not the historicity 
of man but, for instance, the history of the nation. I t  would also 
open the way to finding another series of questions that would elucidate 
these passages. Such an approach is not, I think, fundamentally 
out of harmony with Bultmann's project; i t  recognizes the diversity 
of New Testament witness and allows the Word to address man 
through this diversity" (p. 153). 
Young's second major criticism is directed toward Bultmann's view 
of revelation. While defending Bultmann against Ogden's charge 
of inconsistency in maintaining the unique act of God in Christ, he 
is not satisfied with the separation of the Jesus of history from the 
Christ of faith, the lack of content in the revelation of God, and the 
tendency to locate God's act in preaching and not to acknowledge 
that the event began with Jesus himself. Nevertheless, he feels that 
it is still possible to remain within the Bultmannian system without 
the weakness cited above. To show that this is possible he refers to 
the work of the new questers who, with the same view of history as 
Bultmann, seek to bridge the gap between the Christ of faith and 
the Jesus of history and in doing this provide some content, however 
minimal, to the revelation of God. His own "constructive alternative" 
follows the lead of Gogarten who insists "that the act of God originates 
not in the kerygma about Jesus, nor in the 'nature' of Jesus as a 
past-historical personality, but in the proclamation of Jesus himself" 
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(p. 126). In this way, the historical Jesus becomes of primary signifi- 
cance, for i t  is in him that God proclaims his word. Thus while "Jesus 
becomes the eschatological event in the church's proclamation," 
"this is true only because first he became the eschatological event 
by his own obedient hearing, proclaiming, and living of the word 
given to him by God" (p. 126). 
These criticisms of Bultmann are not new, but the author's claim 
of providing these dternatives within Bultmann's system is, I t  is 
possible for him to do so with his first alternative of "complete exege- 
sis" only because he resorts to "the most basic of his hermeneutical 
principles, viz., that the interpreter should bring to the text the ques- 
tion that concerned the author" (p. 153). For Young this wouId mean 
that there would be legitimate concerns other than the question of 
human existence, but for Bultmann, approaching the Bible with 
Heidegger's analysis of man, other concerns would be irrelevant and 
peripheral and would distort the Scripture's main concern and thrust. 
To Young's attempt to work with Bultmann's system, the latter 
would surely say, "Nein !" 
To the second alternative Bultmann would also say, "Nein!" but 
his voice would be muffled somewhat by the fact that his students have 
attempted to work in the same direction. There is, therefore, some 
justification for Young's claim that this alternative is workable 
within Bultrnann's system. However, in this and in the work of the 
new questers there seems to be an inexplicable reticence to show that 
Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah, for fear that this would 
remove the scandal or objectify faith. Even if historical criticism 
should prove the claim, it hardly seems that this would remove the 
scandal or objectify faith. Bultrnann especially thinks this would 
be faith with works, a kind of legalism. I t  has been proved by historical 
criticism that many throughout history have claimed divine status, 
but this does not in itself compel faith. Whether it can in fact be 
proved that Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah is for historical 
criticism to determine, but there should be no reticence in declaring 
that he understood himself as  such for fear that faith would be compel- 
led and objectified. Nevertheless, the question needs to be asked, 
"Is it possible to follow Young's alternative here, not because Butt- 
mann's method disallows it, but only becmse Bultmann himself 
does so ? Is the fault with Bultmann's method or with Bultmann 7" 
Young thinks it is the latter. 
One question kept arising throughout the reading of the book, 
"Why does Young feel he needs to wear Bultmann's armor?" To 
approach his two major positions, he could have started out just as 
well with another method. I t  would have been much simpler. 
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